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Do Accruals-earnings Management Constraints and Intellectual Capital Efficiency
Trigger Asymmetric Cost Behaviour? Evidence from Australia

Summary at a glance
This study examined whether accruals earnings management constraints and intellectual
capital (IC) efficiency affect asymmetric cost behaviour. It found that, on average, when
firms experience accruals earnings management constraints in avoiding unfavourable
earnings in the current year, they tend to cut slack resources aggressively, leading to
increased anti-sticky cost behaviour. Further, IC efficiency increases the degree of cost
stickiness owing to managers’ optimistic expectations about sales. Lastly, asymmetric
cost behaviour has intensified in the post-International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS) period owing to increased IC efficiency after IFRS adoption.
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Abstract
This study examines whether accruals-earnings management constraints and intellectual
capital (IC) efficiency affect the asymmetric cost behaviour of managers by analysing
data for the 1990 to 2016 period on firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange.
The analysis results reveal that, on average, anti-sticky cost behaviour occurs when
firms have limited ability to engage in accrual-earnings management to manipulate
earnings in the current year. Further, IC efficiency—particularly human capital
efficiency—increases the degree of cost stickiness. This study also finds that the degree
of asymmetric cost behaviour is more pronounced in the post-International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS) period than in the pre-IFRS period. The results suggest that
the increased asymmetric cost behaviour in the post-IFRS period derives from higher IC
efficiency relative to the pre-IFRS period. This study presents important implications
for external stakeholders because they can consider the extent of earnings management
constraints and the extent of firms’ IC efficiency as the determinants of asymmetric-cost
behaviour when assessing firms’ cost behaviour.

Keywords: asymmetric-cost behaviour, accruals-earnings management constraints,
intellectual capital efficiency, earnings targets, International Financial Reporting
Standards.

3

Introduction
Over the past decade, the assumption that cost behaviour is asymmetric rather than
symmetric for activity volume increases and decreases has emerged in management
accounting literature. Asymmetric cost behaviour was first investigated by Anderson et
al. (2003), drawing considerable academic attention. Asymmetric cost behaviour arises
when the cost response to a decrease in activity is smaller or greater than the cost
response to an increase in activity. Such cost behaviour can be further defined as sticky
or anti-sticky (Weiss 2010)—costs are termed sticky when the costs rise more with
increases in activity volume than they fall with decreases of the same amount (Anderson
et al. 2003), and they are termed anti-sticky when the costs fall more with deceases in
activity volume than they rise with increases of the same amount (Weiss 2010).
According to Weiss (2010), a firm with stickier costs shows a greater decline in
earnings when the activity level falls than a firm with less sticky costs does, as stickier
costs result in a smaller cost adjustment when activity level declines and, therefore,
lower cost savings. Lower cost savings result in a greater decrease in earnings, on the
other hand, a firm with anti-sticky costs shows a smaller decline in earnings when the
activity volume falls than a firm with sticky costs does, as anti-sticky costs result in a
greater cost adjustment when activity volume declines and, therefore, a lower decrease
in earnings. Asymmetric cost behaviour has been explained in several ways, but the
most common explanation is associated with cost-benefit management capacity
decisions in the face of changing demand (Cannon 2011).
Several studies have investigated asymmetric-cost behaviour finding that
asymmetric-cost behaviour is seen in firms in the United States (US) (e.g. Anderson et
al. 2003; Balakrishnan et al. 2004; Bosch and Blandon 2011; Chen et al. 2012); Japan
(e.g. He et al. 2010), Australia (e.g. Bugeja et al. 2015), as well as in other countries
(e.g. Porporato and Werbin 2010; Calleja et al. 2006). However, asymmetric-cost
behaviour is still in its infant stage and it is worth to expand (Banker et al., 2017).
Bugeja et al. (2015) stated that there is little empirical evidence on how costs behave in
Australia.
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Banker et al. (2017) categorised the determinants of cost behaviour into constraints
(e.g., the existence of adjustment costs, changes in economic activity amount, and debt
covenants), managers’ incentives (e.g., meeting earnings targets, avoiding earnings
declines or losses, and ownership types) and expectation biases (e.g., managers’
optimistic or pessimistic expectations regarding sales). They stated that the extant
accounting literature does not comprehensively clarify whether cost stickiness is ‘good’
cost stickiness (e.g., it primarily reflects rational or strategic resource management that
drives future sales to avoid adjustment costs) or ‘bad’ (e.g., it reflects wasteful
overspending owing to an agency problem). Moreover, Banker et al. (2017) proposed
extending empirical cost stickiness tests should incorporate the dynamic role of resource
investment as a driver of future revenue.
This study attempts to fill this gap in the literature. First, this study stems from the
agency theory, which suggests that managerial incentives to gain personal wealth (Chen
et al. 2012) and/or concerns about meeting or beating earnings benchmarks drive the
degree of cost stickiness (Kama and Weiss 2013). This study attempts to examine
whether accruals-earnings management constraints of firms could trigger the
asymmetric cost behaviour of their management. The rationale behind this investigation
is that when firms have limited ability to manipulate their earnings to avoid
unfavourable results, managers could adjust cost by increased cutting down of slack
resources during a period of declining sales to deliberately increase earnings. Second,
this study stems from managerial expectations related to sales decline. Studies have
revealed that factors such as overconfidence influence managers’ resource commitment
decisions (Chen et al. 2015; Qin et al. 2015) and hubris (Yang 2015). Optimistic
(pessimistic) expectations in relation to sales declines lead to an increase (decrease) in
cost stickiness (Anderson et al. 2003). Researchers believe that intellectual capital (IC)
can yield economic benefits and enhance firm performance (e.g., Joshi et al., 2013;
Clarke et al., 2011). When IC is efficient, managers could be optimistic regarding future
earnings and would retain current unutilised resources even in case of decline in sales.
They might believe that the increase in future sales generated using IC would absorb the
cost of unutilised resources, and hence, this belief would lead to cost stickiness.
Therefore, this study examines whether IC efficiency induces asymmetric cost
behaviour.
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This study chose Australia for the following reasons: first, as Bugeja et al. (2015)
stated, most studies on cost stickiness focus on the United States (US), but significant
variations exist between Australia and the US as regards market competition, firm
characteristics, economic structure, governance environment and major industries.
Second, Australia, as a country with a balance sheet-oriented conceptual framework,
common law legal system, high level of shareholder protection and low conformity
between taxation reporting and financial accounting, differs from the US in terms of
regulatory and reporting environments (Chalmers et al. 2008, 2011; Lont et al. 2010).
Unlike in the US, the regulatory environment in Australia allows a more ‘principlesbased’ other than ‘rules-based’ approach in many areas, including compliance with
accounting standards (Lont et al. 2010). In addition, the latter’s reporting environment
differs from that of the former in terms of the extent of analyst following and
institutional setting (Coulton et al. 2005). Analyst following of Australian companies is
considerably less intensive compared with that of US companies (Habib and Hossain
2008).
Further, Australian institutional investors are less likely than their US counterparts to
seek to use their voting power to influence management behaviour (Craswell et al.
1997; Wilson and Wang 2010). Unlike in the US, where earnings manipulation is the
dominance of equity-based compensation schemes, in Australia, although executive
stock options are awarded, it has not been a widespread practice (Coulton et al. 2005).
Around one-third of the CEOs in Australia’s largest firms did not receive any equitybased compensation (Matolcsy and Wright 2007). These differences could lead to
variations between the two countries in cost behaviour arising from managerial
operating decisions.
Lastly, Australia provides an ideal ground for IC reporting because it has experienced
fast economic growth and is also undergoing a transformation with an increasing
emphasis on new sectors, such as niche manufacturing, information technology, tourism
and financial services. It is also experiencing a relative decline in its traditionally strong
areas of mining and agriculture (Guthrie et al. 1999; Abeysekera 2008). Australian
firms were considered to follow ‘best practices’ in IC reporting (Guthrie et al. 1999;
Guthrie and Petty 2000a, b). Guthrie et al. (2006) found that Australian companies in
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2002 disclosed more IC information than Australian companies in 1998 and Hong Kong
companies in 2002. In a comparison of Australia and Sri Lanka, Abeysekera (2007)
demonstrated that Australian firms were far more involved in research and
development, investors in Australia were more willing to support entrepreneurship and
Australia has more comprehensive laws to protect intellectual property rights.
Therefore, Australia provides a good context to study IC and its influence on managers’
operating decision-making.
The purpose of this study is to examine whether accruals-earnings management
constraints and IC efficiency affect management asymmetric cost behaviour of firms
listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). The results reveal the existence of
anti-sticky cost behaviour when firms have limited ability to apply accruals earnings
management to manipulate their earnings. The effect intensifies when firms have
incentives to avoid unfavourable earnings (i.e., earnings declines or losses). When
managers have strong incentives to avoid earnings decrease or losses but have limited
ability to engage in accruals-earnings management, they are more willing to cut costs
aggressively during periods of weak demand. Further, the study finds that IC
efficiency—particularly human capital efficiency—increases sticky cost behaviour. The
results demonstrate that under IC efficiency, managers believe that IC will generate
future revenue. Even there is a decline in sales in current year, but the managers may
believe decline is temporary and therefore they decide to carry the cost of unutilised
resources, because they believe the cost absorption will occur during periods of
increasing demand in the future. In the additional test, this study examines whether the
adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) could influence
asymmetric cost behaviour. This study finds that such behaviour is more pronounced in
the post-IFRS period as the results of higher IC efficiency in the post-IFRS period
compared with the pre-IFRS period.
This paper contributes to the literature on asymmetric-cost behaviour in three
significant ways. First, although there is a rapid growth in studies on asymmetric-cost
behaviour, most studies focus on investigating cost stickiness, and few seek to examine
both sticky and anti-sticky-cost behaviour. This study extends prior research to
investigate total asymmetric-cost behaviour and its two components (i.e., sticky and
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anti-sticky-cost behaviour) in Australian ASX-listed firms. Second, prior research
provides evidence that corporate governance (Chen et al. 2012), firm size (Via and
Perego 2014; Anderson et al. 2003), industry (Subramaniam and Weidenmier 2003; Via
and Perego 2014), labour market (Banker and Chen 2006; Banker et al. 2013),
employee intensity (Anderson et al. 2003) affect sticky-cost behaviour. This study
examines whether IC efficiency affects asymmetric-cost behaviour and whether
increasing IC efficiency influences asymmetric-cost behaviour. Third, agency problem
has been cited as a cause of asymmetric-cost behaviour (because managers are
motivated to deliberately manage costs) (e.g. Chen et al. 2012; Kama and Weiss, 2013);
however, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there is no empirical study that
examines how managers deliberately manage costs when firms have limited ability to
manage earnings using accruals. Thus, this study adds to the literature on asymmetriccost behaviour by examining whether asymmetric costs are exhibited when firms have
limited ability to apply accruals-earnings management.
The remainder of the paper is presented as follows. Section 2 provides a literature
review. Section 3 provides hypotheses development of this study. Section 4 describes
the research design including sample selection and the empirical models. Section 5
provides the descriptive statistics, correlation of the variables and regression results.
Section 6 provides the additional tests. Section 7 presents conclusion.
Literature Review
Analysing cost behaviour is a critical topic in the management accounting research.
Anderson et al. (2003) provided the first empirical evidence that costs behave
asymmetrically in relation to a firm’s activity volume. The study examined asymmetric
behaviour in selling, general and administrative (SG&A) costs using a sample of 7 629
US firms over a period of 20 years. The study found that SG&A costs increased 0.55
percent per one percent increase in sales, but decreased only 0.35 percent per one
percent decrease in sales, on average. The authors labelled this behaviour ‘sticky’.
Several studies have confirmed Anderson et al.’s (2003) results, finding that US firms
exhibit significant cost stickiness (e.g. Balakrishnan et al. 2004; Bosch and Blandon
2011; Chen et al. 2012).
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Cost stickiness has also been investigated in an international context. He et al. (2010)
observed whether SG&A costs are sticky in Japanese firms using a sample of 1 802
firms over 25 years. Their results suggested that sticky cost behaviour is present in
Japanese firms. They found evidence that SG&A costs increased 0.59 percent every one
percent increase in sales, but fell only 0.45 percent every one percent decrease in sales,
on average. Özkaya and Yükcü (2011) provided evidence of stickiness in both SG&A
costs and total operating costs in non-financial Turkish firms, while Porporato and
Werbin (2010) found the existence of sticky costs in the banking sectors of Argentina,
Brazil and Canada. Calleja et al. (2006) investigated whether stickiness in operating
costs is exhibited in four countries: UK, US, German and French firms. The results
showed that cost stickiness was exhibited in all four countries, but found that the
stickiness was weaker in US and UK firms relative to French and German firms. Banker
and Chen (2006) examined whether Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries present different cost behaviour. The authors examined
the sticky behaviour of operating costs using a sample of 12 666 firms from 19 OECD
countries over 10 years. The study provided evidence that the degree of cost stickiness
differs across these 19 countries significantly, and that features of the labour market are
important determinants of this cross-country difference.
A debate on cost stickiness has emerged recently in the literature, regarding the
possibility that the degree of cost stickiness might vary systematically across different
cost structures, firm’s characteristics, and the possibility of no stickiness or stickiness
(e.g. Anderson and Lanen 2009; Weiss 2010; Balakrishnan et al. 2014). Anderson and
Lanen (2009) explored sticky cost behaviour related to SG&A costs and other types of
costs, including advertising, labour wages, headcount, research and development, and
property, plant and equipment. They presented evidence that cost changes are almost
equally likely to exhibit asymmetries of both the sticky and anti-sticky variety, as they
are to vary linearly with sales revenue changes. Via and Perego (2014) examined
asymmetric cost behaviour in small- and medium-sized Italian firms over the period
1999–2008 and found that operating costs in the trading industry exhibited sticky
behaviour.
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Many studies currently investigate factors that drive asymmetrical cost behaviour. To
reiterate, the literature mentions three types of drivers of cost stickiness (i.e.,
constraints, managers’ incentives and biases). First, managers choose resource levels
subject to various constraints (e.g., the existence of adjustment costs, changes in
economic activity amount, debt covenants). When the constraints (e.g., adjustment
costs) are larger, managers are more willing to retain unused resources during periods of
sales decrease. Researchers confirm that constraints play a role in cost management
decisions. For example, Anderson et al. (2003) used asset intensity and employee
intensity as proxies for firm-level constraints, and Banker et al. (2013b) used the
strictness of employment protection laws in OECD countries as a country-level
constraint proxy. They both found that these management constraints could trigger
asymmetric cost behaviour. A high level of constraints hinders managerial decisionmaking on reducing optional resources in proportion to decreased economic activity
(Balakrishnan et al. 2014; Banker et al., 2017).
Secondly, the degree of cost stickiness is affected by mangers’ incentives (e.g.,
meeting earnings targets, avoiding earnings declines or losses). Chen et al. (2012)
examined the influence of the agency problem and corporate governance on the degree
of cost stickiness using the data of US firms over 10 years. The authors found a positive
relationship between the agency problem and the degree of cost asymmetry. The
positive relationship between the agency problem and the degree of cost asymmetry is
mitigated by strong corporate governance, suggesting that strong corporate governance
can help to mitigate the effect of the agency problem on the degree of cost asymmetry.
Kama and Weiss (2013) examined whether managers’ incentives of avoiding losses or
meeting earnings targets influence the degree of costs stickiness. Their results showed
that when managers face incentives to avoid earnings decreases or losses, or to meet
financial analysts’ earnings forecasts, the degree of cost stickiness is reduced, indicating
that incentives of avoiding losses or meeting earnings targets induce managers expedite
downward adjustment of unused resources for sales decreases. Bugeja et al. (2015)
examine the characteristics and determinants of cost stickiness in Australia using a
sample of Australian listed firms from the period 1990–2010, and found that on
average, Australian firms exhibit sticky-cost behaviour. They also found that the degree
of cost stickiness increased after the adoption of IFRS, and that an increase in
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managers’ incentives to avoid decreases in earnings or losses reduces sticky-cost
behaviour.
Third, managers’ expectation biases regarding projected sales levels (e.g., their
optimistic or pessimistic expectations in relation to sales declines) can affect their cost
behaviour. Banker et al. (2016a) provided evidence that cost stickiness, along with
conservatism, determines asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Anderson et al. (2003)
revealed that managerial optimism increases cost stickiness. Banker et al. (2014)
proxied for expectations using different combinations of sales increase and decrease
over two consecutive periods. As expected, they found significant cost stickiness in the
optimistic scenario (two successive periods of sales increase) and significant cost antistickiness in the pessimistic scenario (two successive periods of sales decrease). Banker
et al. (2016b) use capacity utilisation as a proxy for optimism and found that high
capacity utilisation is associated with greater cost stickiness. Thus, the empirical
evidence consistently shows that concurrent demand changes as well as managers’
forward-looking demand expectations influence cost management decisions in the
current period.
Hypotheses development
As an extension of the argument that managers’ incentives drive the degree of cost
stickiness (Bugeja et al. 2005; Kama and Weiss 2013; Banker et al. 2017), this study
aims to understand whether cost stickiness occurs when firms have limited ability to use
accruals earnings management to manage earnings in the current year.
Apart from cost management, managers have several techniques they can employ to
avoid earnings decreases, and managers must balance the cost benefit of employing
different techniques (Palmrose et al. 2004; Desai et al. 2006). Accruals-earnings
management is a popular choice because it has no first-order effect on cash flows
(Badertscher 2011; Doukakis 2014; Gunny 2010). However, accruals-earnings
management has limitations. First, aggressive choices about accruals are at a higher risk
of regulatory litigation and scrutiny because accrual accounting choices are subject to
auditor scrutiny, and high levels of accrual manipulation tend to be discovered by
regulators (Graham et al. 2005), particularly for public listed firms. Second, the reverse
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nature of accruals-earnings management can be problematic because a firm must
conquer the potential reversal of the previous year’s accruals-earnings management to
influence the current year’s earnings (Badertscher 2011). This paper aims to examine
whether accruals constraints affect managers’ incentives to employ cost management to
avoid earnings declines by deliberately cutting slack resource. Cutting slack resources
aggressively when there is decline in sales could help managers avoid earnings declines
or losses when managers have limited ability to utilise the accruals earnings
management to avoid unfavourable earnings in the current year results. This could result
in the firm exhibiting asymmetric-cost behaviour in the current year. Given that this
study is the first to examine accruals-earnings management constraints as a determinant
of cost asymmetry, the paper states the hypothesis in a null form as follows:
H1: Accruals-earnings management constraints do not influence the degree of cost
asymmetry.
IC was recognised as being significant and therefore it became desirable to measure
and report IC as a means of creating and managing a firm’s sustainable competitive
advantage (Guthrie et al. 2012). In recent decades, the term ‘IC’ has been used as an
instrument of value creation, which has led to interdisciplinary researchers investigating
how the capital market has reacted to the potential of IC to create firm value (Dumay
and Tull, 2007; Murthy and Abeysekera, 2007; Guthrie et al., 2012). Guthrie and Petty
(2000c) suggest that IC is used as a foundation on which to create and use knowledge to
enhance firm value, which means that IC refers to the ability to translate organisational
knowledge into value. IC underlines the importance of using the capital generated by
resources and human beings to generate products and services in a competitive manner,
and this is reflected in strong firm performance and the creation of value (Phusavat et al.
2011; Guthrie et al. 2012; De Silva et al. 2014).
Evidence about IC and firms’ financial performance in Australia generally supports
the belief that IC can enhance their financial performance as well as convey useful
forward-looking financial information that is relevant to investors evaluating firm value.
For example, Joshi et al. (2013) examined the relationship between IC, measured by
Pulic (1998)’s value-added intellectual coefficient (VAIC)TM, and firm financial
performance, measured by return on assets (ROA), in the Australian financial sector for
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the 2006–2008 period. They found that in all Australian-owned banks, human capital is
slightly more efficient than structural capital and capital employed. Clarke et al. (2011)
examined the effect that IC efficiency has on the performance of Australian listed firms
between 2004 and 2008. They measured IC efficiency using VAICTM and financial
performance by return on equity, ROA, revenue growth and employee productivity. The
results indicated a positive relationship between IC efficiency and firm performance,
particularly in the case of capital employed efficiency (CCE) and human capital
efficiency (HCE), as well as between HCE and structural capital efficiency (SCE) in the
prior year and performance in the current year. Kim and Taylor (2014) compared the
value relevance of the productivity of IC and its components, and the productivity of the
book value of assets using data from 2006 to 2010 on a sample of 160 Australian listed
firms. They developed models that drew on publicly available share prices and financial
information to compute and compare the value relevance of the productivity of IC as
well as its components of structural and human capital. They measured IC using a
components-based direct IC measurement on hand-collected annual reports. The results
showed that the productivity of structural capital, human capital and IC were each
positively associated with share price, whereas the productivity of total assets at book
value was insignificant and of tangible assets was negatively significant. The authors
concluded that the book value of intangible and tangible assets in the balance sheet has
no value relevance, while intangible assets in the balance sheet represent only a fraction
of IC.
This study assumes that efficient use of IC will enhance firms’ financial performance.
If firms experience a decrease in sales, managers may prefer to sustain current
unutilised resources because they feel confident in the increased future firm
performance that may be generated by IC. This is based on the argument that, when
managers are optimistic about future performance, they are willing to retain unused
resources during periods of sales decrease because they believe cost absorption will
occur during periods of increased firm performance in the future. This tendency to
retain resources should increase cost stickiness (Anderson et al. 2003; Banker et al.
2017). This study assumes that IC efficiency could trigger sticky cost behaviour because
IC could bring future economic benefits to firms. Managers could believe the future
economic benefits will absorb the costs incurred during periods of sales decrease.
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However, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no study has examined empirically
whether IC efficiency and its three components—HCE, SCE and CEE— lead to
asymmetric cost behaviour in Australia. This paper thus states hypothesis in a null form
below:
H2: IC efficiency and its three components (i.e., HCE, SCE and CEE) do not
influence the degree of cost asymmetry.

Research Design
Data and Sample Selection
This study used ASX-listed firms from years 1990-2016. The data were obtained from
the Morningstar DatAnalysis supplementary by Compustat Global Vantage database2.
The sample period starts from 1990 because there is no data in the Morningstar
DatAnalysis database prior 1990. Firms involved in the financial and real estate sectors
were excluded because they are subject to different reporting requirements. Following
prior literature (e.g. Anderson et al. 2003; Via and Perego 2014), this study excluded the
firm-year observations with negative book value of equity, negative total assets, or
negative or missing sales revenue. This study also trimmed the top and the bottom 1%
of the sample and excluded sample firms with missing data for the interested and
control variables (see Empirical model to test the hypotheses). The final sample
consisted of 10 048 firm-year observations.
Measurement of Accruals Earnings Management Constrains
Due to the constrained flexibility of accruals, the ability of managers to manage
accruals upwards in the current period is limited by accrual management activities in
previous periods. This paper follows previous studies (Badertscher 2011; Barton and
Simko, 2002; Zang, 2012), where net operating assets are used as a proxy for the extent

2

Data about employee salaries and wages are not available in DatAnalysis, and this study hence obtained
such data from the Compustat Global Vantage database.
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of accruals management in previous periods to represent a firm’s ability to manage
earnings using accruals. If the net operating assets at the beginning of the year are high,
managers’ abilities to use accruals to manipulate earnings are reduced in the current
year because the balance sheet and income statement are articulated. Therefore,
abnormal accruals shown in past earnings can also be shown in net assets, and hence the
latter are overstated when firms have practiced accruals management previously (Barton
and Simko, 2002; Zang, 2012). Net operating assets at the beginning of a year (NOA) is
measured by shareholders’ equity minus cash and cash equivalent, plus total debt
divided by lagged sales for firm j, at the beginning of year t. Therefore, NOA consists
mainly of accrual-based measures of net assets used in operations. This proxy is
consistent with the assumption that overstated net assets are less efficient at generating a
given level of sales, all else equal (Barton and Simko, 2002).
Measurement of IC Efficiency
Following Chen et al. (2005) and Clarke et al. (2011), IC efficiency is calculated using
Pulic (1998)’s VAIC (i.e., value added intellectual coefficient). VAIC includes three
components: human capital efficiency, structural capital efficiency, and capital
employed efficiency.
To calculate VAIC, the first step is to calculate the ability of a firm to create value
added (VA) to all stakeholders. Following previous studies (e.g. Chen et al. 2005; Tan,
Plowman, and Hancock 2008; Clarke et al. 2011), VA can be expressed as follows:
VA=S-B=NI + W + T +I +DP

(1)

where: S is net sales revenues (output); B is cost of goods sold (input); NI is net income
after tax; W is employee wages and salaries; T is taxes; I is interest expense; and DP is
depreciation.
Human capital efficiency (HCE)
Human capital (HC) includes the knowledge, experiences, skills, productivity, and
employees competence (Clarke et al. 2011). HCE is calculated as:
HCE = VA/HC

(2)
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HC is defined as salaries and wages at a point in time (Pulic, 1998). HCE indicates the
amount of VA generated by a dollar spent on HC.
Structural capital efficiency (SCE)
Structural capital (SC) includes IC items such as strategy, organisational networks,
patents, and brand names. Pulic (1998) calculates SCE as follows:
SCE = SC/VA

(3)

SC is measured as VA minus HC. SCE, therefore, demonstrates the dollar of SC within
the firm, for every dollar of value that is added, and as HCE increases, SCE increases.

Capital employed efficiency (CEE)
Capital employed efficiency (CEE) includes the efficiency that HCE and SCE fail to
capture. Pulic (1998) argues that IC cannot create value on its own, and so must be
combined with (physical and financial) capital employed (CE).
CEE is defined as:
CEE = VA/CE

(4)

CE is calculated as total assets minus intangible assets and CEE demonstrates the
amount of VA created by a dollar spent on CE.

VAIC
VAIC includes the three individual efficiencies and is the aggregation of the three
efficiencies:
VAIC = HCE+ CEE + SCE

(5)

A greater VAIC represents greater efficiency in IC capitals employed, and thus greater
value generated to the firm.
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Empirical Model to test the hypotheses
Many empirical studies have measured cost behaviour using the asymmetrical cost
regression model of Anderson et al. (2003) (e.g. Balakrishnan et al. 2004; Chen et al.
2012; Via and Perego, 2014; Bugeja et al., 2015). This study also relies on the
Anderson et al. (2003)’s model and extends the model by including two additional
determinants (i.e., NOA and VAIC), which is presented as below:
Log
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where: Cost is operating expenses and Sales is operating revenue. Decrease Dummy (D)
is coded as 1 when operating revenues in year t are less than those in year t-1, and zero
otherwise. Coefficient β1 measures the percentage increase in operating costs with a one
percent increase in operating revenue. Because the value of D is 1 when revenue
decreases, the sum of the coefficients (β1 + β2) measures the percentage change in
operating costs with a one percent decrease in operating revenue. A positive coefficient
β2 represents costs anti-stickiness, while a negative coefficient β2 represents costs
stickiness. 𝐷𝑀j,t,k is a determinant of cost stickiness, including NOA and VAIC.
Following Bugeja et al. (2015) and Kama and Weiss (2013), this study included some
other known determinants in the empirical model. They are gross domestic product
(GDP) growth rate; revenue decline in the preceding period (SUCC), which is a dummy
variable coded ‘1’ if revenue in t − 1 is lower than revenue in t − 2, and ‘0’ otherwise;
property, plant, and equipment intensity (PPE), which is measured by the ratio of
property, plant and equipment to sales; asset intensity (Asset), the ratio of total assets to
sales; employee intensity (EMP), the ratio of the employees’ salaries to sales;
managerial incentives to avoid unfavourable earnings (Avoid), which is a dummy
variable coded ‘1’ if Avoidloss = 1 or Avoiddec = 1, and ‘0’ otherwise. Avoidloss is a
dummy variable coded ‘1’ if firm j has earnings per share higher than or equal to zero
but lower than one cent, and ‘0’ otherwise. Avoiddec is a dummy variable coded ‘1’ if
earnings per share of firm j is higher than or equal to that for the previous period but the
difference is less than one cent, and ‘0’ otherwise. Equations (6) includes time and
industry effects to control for the unobservable confounding variables that differ across
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time but are constant across the industries, as well as those that differ across industries
but are constant over time.
Empirical Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of variables for H1 and H2. The mean and
median of NOA is 1.296 and 0.787, respectively, indicating that the accruals-earnings
management constraints exist in Australian firms and that these constraints are quite
high. Further, the mean of VAIC is 0.868 and the median is 1.880. Among the three IC
components, HCE has the highest mean (mean = 0.930), indicating that human capital
accounts for the major part of IC in Australia. Similar to Bugeja et al. (2015), this study
finds that the mean and median of ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡) is 0.105 and 0.077, respectively.
∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠) has mean of 0.109 and median of 0.074. The mean of Avoid is 0.308,
suggesting that managers have strong incentives to avoid unfavourable earnings (i.e.,
earnings declines or losses). On average, property, plant and equipment account for
67.8% of sales and employee salaries for 15.9%.

<Insert Table 1 about here>
Regression Results
Regression results for H1
Table 2 presents the year–industry fixed-effects ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
results for H1. The results reveal that on average, cost stickiness is present in Australia,
and as shown by the results for the first model in Table 2, the estimated value of β1 is
0.460 (p-value = 0.000), indicating that operating costs increase 0.460% per 1%
increase in sales revenues. However, the estimated value of β2 is −0.081 (pvalue = 0.002), suggesting that costs decrease by 0.379% for a 1% decrease in sales
revenues. The results remain the same on including control variables. The results
presented for the second model show that the degree of cost stickiness increases with a
firm’s asset intensity (Asset), PPE intensity (PPE), and employee intensity (EMP), and
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the decreases when revenues reduce in the preceding period (SUCC), offering managers
the incentive to avoid unfavourable earnings (Avoid). These results are generally
consistent with those of Bugeja et al. (2015).
The third model shown in Table 2 demonstrates that ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)*D*NOA is
significant and positively associated with ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡) (coefficient = 0.011; pvalue = 0.005), indicating that when firms have limited ability to use accruals to manage
earnings, managers tend to cut unutilised costs when sales decline and to constrain
resource expansion when sales increase. This approach results in costs becoming antisticky. This result is also confirmed by including the control variables shown in fourth
model. Moreover, the results in Table 2 reveal that managers’ incentive to avoid
unfavourable earnings intensifies the relationship between NOA and the degree of antisticky cost behaviour. The fifth model shows that ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)*D*NOA*Avoid is
significant and positively associated with ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡) (coefficient = 0.032; pvalue =0.003 ), indicating that when managers have incentives to avoid unfavourable
earnings but have limited ability to apply accruals-earnings management to manage
earnings, they are more willing to cut slack resources aggressively to meet current
earnings targets.
<Insert Table 2 about here>
Regression Results for H2
Table 3 presents the year–industry fixed-effects OLS regression results for H2. The
results for the first model in Table 3 indicate that on average, total IC efficiency
increases the degree of cost stickiness, as observed in the negative and significant
relationship between ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)*D*VAIC and ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡) shown for the first model
of Table 3 (coefficient = −0.022; p-value = 0.002). These results suggest that on
efficiently employing IC, firms tend to sustain current resources when their sales
decrease because they may believe IC will enhance future sales and thus the firm will be
able to absorb cost incurred on unutilised resources owing to the decline in sales3. This
3 H2 assumes that managers are optimistic about future performance when there is efficient IC because
IC could enhance future performance to absorb the costs incurred during periods of sales decline. To
confirm that IC could enhance future financial performance, the Pearson correlation analysis is
conducted. Based on Chen et al. (2005) and Clarke et al. (2011), three financial performance
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optimistic expectation about future performance increases cost stickiness. The result
holds on including the control variables in the second model shown in Table 3.
The results for the third, fourth, and fifth models in Table 3 reveal the influence of IC
components on the degree of cost stickiness. The results show that HCE and CEE
increase the degree of cost stickiness, because ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡) is significant and negatively
related to ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)*D*HCE and ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)*D*CEE (coefficient = −0.130; pvalue = 0.000; coefficient = −0.012; p-value = 0.039, respectively), but very weakly
associated with ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠) *D*SCE (coefficient = −0.001; p-value = 0.089). The
results indicate that on average, the firms that employ human, physical and financial
capital more efficiently exhibit more sticky costs. Further, human capital increases cost
stickiness to a greater extent than physical and financial capital. The possible
explanation for this finding is that physical and financial capital would add value to
firms more quickly than human capital—for example, firms might use new plant and
equipment (capital employed) to produce products in a relatively short period, whereas
human capital might not add value to firms equally quickly. For example, new
employees may not add value until after gaining experience.
<Insert Table 3 about here>
Additional Tests: The effect of IFRS
On the first of January 2005, Australia adopted the International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS), as formulated by the International Accounting Standards Board
(IASB). While the Australian Accounting Standards Board had been converging the
Australian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (AGAAP) with IFRS, the
mandatory adoption of IFRS moved accounting standards towards the introduction of
fair value as a preferred basis for measuring assets, while recognizing unrealized gains
and losses through changes in the fair value of assets reported in the income statements,
along with extensive explanatory disclosures (Australian Institute of Company
measurements are used: ROA, ROE and revenue growth. The time periods are measured by t + 1, t + 2
and t + 3, where t ranges from 1990 to 2014, as data were only available up to 2017. The results show that
VAIC is positively and significantly associated with three future financial performance measurements.
Specifically, VAIC is positively and significantly associated with ROAt+1 (correlation = 0.5523, p-value =
0.000). The table results can be provided upon request.
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Directors (AICD) and Financial Services Institute of Australasia (FINSIA) 2009). The
adoption of IFRS in Australia changed accountancy practices for intangible assets,
goodwill, financial and taxation instruments, share-based payments and the impairment
of non-current assets (see Chalmers et al. 2008, 2011; Haswell and Langfield-Smith
2008). IFRS-led earnings are considered high quality because they represent a series of
the best accounting practices in the world, and are more capital-market oriented than
many domestic accounting standards owing to the adoption of the fair value
measurement basis (Ding et al. 2007). Moreover, IFRS has enhanced the quality of
information and the compatibility of financial reporting by promoting a uniform set of
accounting standards across the globe (Jeanjean and Stolowy 2008). Consequently, the
adoption of IFRS could decrease costs for investors when comparing firms from
different markets and nations, helping to boost international investment and integrate
capital markets (Covrig et al. 2007).
The literature typically documents conflicting evidence about the effect of IFRS on
earnings quality in Australia. Chalmers et al. (2008) examined whether the value
relevance of reported intangibles differs between pre-IFRS and post-IFRS periods. They
found evidence that IFRS generally conveys incremental useful information to investors
about goodwill, while AGAAP provides incremental information to investors in relation
to identifiable intangibles. However, Goodwin et al. (2008) and Clarkson et al. (2011)
did not find supporting evidence on IFRS adoption leading to enhanced value relevance
of accounting information. Lai et al. (2013) examined the change of accruals reliability
in the pre- and post-IFRS periods during 1998–2008 for ASX listed firms. They found
that accrual reliability declined significantly after mandatory IFRS implementation. Lai
et al. (2013) examined the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on accounting
conservatism in Australia. They found that IFRS adoption has led to decreased
asymmetric timeliness, but to increased other conservatism measurements. The authors
conclude that the question regarding the long-term effects of IFRS on financial
reporting conservatism remains unanswered. Jin et al. (2015) investigated the quality of
matching between contemporaneous revenues and expenses for the pre-IFRS period
(2001–2005) and post-IFRS period (2006–2011). The authors found that the revenue–
expense relationship reduced by around 13% in the former, while the matching between
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revenues and expenses increased in the latter. Their results suggest that IFRS enhanced
the quality of matching between revenues and expenses.
This section attempts to add value to the existing conflicting evidence regarding the
effect of IFRS on earnings quality in Australia. This section aims to examine how IC
efficiency and earnings quality change from pre-IFRS to post-IFRS. Moreover, Bugeja
et al. (2015) examined the characteristics and determinants of cost stickiness in
Australia using a large sample of Australian listed firms from 1990 to 2010. They found
some preliminary evidence that the extent of cost asymmetry increased after the
adoption of IFRS. However, they failed to determine how the accounting policy
changes caused by the adoption of IFRS would in aggregate affect the degree of cost
stickiness. This section extends Bugeja et al.’s (2015) study to examine whether the
increased cost asymmetry behaviour in the post-IFRS period was caused by changes in
IC efficiency and earnings management constraints.

To provide insights into changes in cost stickiness, this section includes an
interaction term between a Post dummy and cost stickiness in the regression analysis,
where Post is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for firm-years after the
introduction of IFRS (i.e., from 2006–2016), and 0 otherwise.
Table 4 Panel A presents the descriptive analysis of NOA, IC and its three
components before and after IFRS adoption. The results show that IC efficiency
increased significantly after the adoption of IFRS: the mean of VAIC (mean =0.601)
before IFRS adoption is lower than that (mean =1.339) after adoption (t-value
=−11.120; p-value = 0.000). As regards the three components of IC, CEE increased
significantly (t-value =−34.294; p-value = 0.000), followed by HCE (t-value =−11.012;
p-value = 0.000), however, SCE has decreased (t-value =2.011; p-value = 0.022). NOA
did not change significantly between the pre-IFRS and post-IFRS periods (t-value
=−0.832; p-value =0.203).
Table 4 Panel B shows the regression results of the effect of IFRS on the degree of
cost stickiness. The first model of Table 4 Panel B shows that the ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡) is
significant and negatively related to ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)*D*Post (coefficient = −0.013; p-
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value = 0.039), indicating that cost stickiness is more pronounced in the post-IFRS
period.

Further,

the

results

presented

in

Table

4

Panel

B

show

that

∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠) *D*Post* NOA is very weakly significant and positively related to
∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡) (coefficient = 0.012; p-value = 0.084) in second model. The results of
third model in Panel B indicate that on average, IC efficiency increases the degree of
cost stickiness more in the post-IFRS period, revealed by the result that the interaction
variable ∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠) *D*Post*VAIC is significant and negatively associated with
∆𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡) (coefficient = −0.015;

p-value = 0.000).

Given

the

more

efficient

employment of IC in the post-IFRS period (as shown in Panel A), after the adoption of
IFRS, managers are more willing to retain current resources when their sales decrease in
the post-IFRS period.
<Insert Table 4 about here>
Conclusion
The literature has examined the determinants of asymmetric cost behaviour (e.g.,
Anderson et al. 2003; Balakrishnan et al. 2004; Bosch and Blandon 2011; Chen et al.
2012; Bugeja et al. 2015). However, few studies have examined whether accrualsearnings management constraints and IC efficiency affect management asymmetric cost
behaviour and whether such behaviour changed after adoption of IFRS in Australia.
This study finds that, when managers have the incentive to avoid unfavourable
earnings in the current year but have limited ability to use accruals-earnings
management to manipulate earnings, they tend to cut slack resources more aggressively
to avoid unfavourable earnings, which leads to anti-sticky cost behaviour. Moreover,
the results of this study show that IC efficiency triggers sticky cost behaviour. The
reason is that managers may believe that IC would generate future revenue and that the
decline in sales is temporary; therefore, they would decide to carry the cost of unutilised
resources, aiming to absorb these unutilised resources during periods of increasing
demand in the future. Among the three IC efficiencies, HCE increases sticky cost the
most, followed by CEE. This study further examined whether asymmetric cost
behaviour changed after IFRS adoption in Australia. The results show that such
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behaviour was more pronounced in the post-IFRS period and this increase was because
of higher IC efficiency in this period than in the pre-IFRS period.
This study provides important implications for users of financial statements (e.g.,
investors, financial analysts, auditors, creditors and standard setters) to understand
managers’ decision-making about cost management. They would understand that under
different circumstances, managers’ decision on adjusting slack resources owing to
decline in demand could vary. Further, users of financial statements could consider the
IC efficiency of companies in developing their prediction models to evaluate future firm
performance.
This study is subject to several limitations. First, like other empirical research, results
may suffer from endogeneity problems. Although this paper used time industry effects
models to control for the unobservable confounding variables that differ across time and
industry, this study could not fully control for all other unobservable variables that
influence explanatory variables. Second, this paper used total operating costs: this
measure of costs has been used in many studies (e.g. Chen et al. 2012; Weiss 2010; Via
and Perego 2014; Bugeja et al. 2015; Calleja et al. 2006); however, SG&A cost is the
common approach in the cost asymmetry literature. Therefore, findings of this paper
should be interpreted cautiously. Third, H2 of this study assumes that managers are
optimistic about future performance when firms have efficient IC because they believe
that IC could enhance future financial performance. Although this study examines the
association between IC efficiency and future financial performance, it fails to find a
proxy for CEO optimism. This presents an avenue for future research to determine the
proxy of CEO optimism (e.g., CEO overconfidence) and examine the relationship
between IC efficiency and CEO optimism to support H2 of this study. Future research
could also investigate the influence of other incentives of managers on cost asymmetry,
such as management compensation, managerial risk taking. Future study could apply
different research methodology to investigate manager motivations and attitudes that
affect asymmetrical cost behaviour; for example, experimental methods or interviews.
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variables

Observations

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Δlog(Cost)

10 048

0.105

0.077

0.416

-4.656

5.507

Δlog(Sales)

10 048

0.109

0.074

0.516

-5.105

12.049

D

10 048

0.312

0.000

0.463

0.000

1.000

SUCC

10 048

0.220

0.000

0.414

0.000

1.000

GDP

10 048

3.093

3.500

1.188

-0.400

5.000

Asset

10 048

19.246

19.092

2.280

12.628

25.812

PPE

10 048

0.678

0.278

2.070

0.009

7.432

EMP

10 048

0.159

0.111

0.653

0.024

0.873

Avoid

10 048

0.308

0.000

0.190

0.000

1.000

VAIC

10 048

0.868

1.880

3.348

-7.576

35.597

HCE

10 048

0.930

0.987

1.153

-6.263

34.589

CEE

10 048

0.781

0.544

0.826

-1.066

4.314

SCE

10 048

-0.843

0.007

2.539

-7.698

23.675

NOA

10 048

1.296

0.787

1.813

-0.033

17.174

Note: Cost is operating expenses and Sales is operating revenue. Decrease Dummy (D) is coded as 1 when operating
revenues in year t are less than those in year t-1, and zero otherwise. GDP is gross domestic product growth rate.
SUCC is revenues declines in the preceding period, which is dummy variable and coded as ‘1’ if revenue in t-1 is
lower than revenue in t-2, 0 otherwise. PPE is Property, plant, and equipment intensity, which is measured by the
ratio of property, plant and equipment to sales; Asset intensity (Asset) is measured by the ratio of total assets to sales.
EMP is employee intensity, which is measured by the ratio of the employees’ salaries to sales. Avoid is managerial
incentives to unfavourable earnings, it is a dummy variable that equals 1 if Avoidloss = 1 or Avoiddec = 1, and 0
otherwise. Where Avoidloss is dummy variable coded ‘1’ if firm j has earnings per share higher than or equal to zero
but lower than one cent, and ‘0’ otherwise. Avoiddec is dummy variable coded ‘1’ if firm j has earnings per share
higher than or equal to that for the previous period but the difference is less than one cent, and ‘0’ otherwise. NOA is
net operating assets, which are measured by shareholders’ equity minus cash, and cash equivalent plus total debt
divided by lagged sales in t-1. HCE is human capital efficiency. SCE represents structural capital efficiency. CEE is
capital employed efficiency. VAIC is the aggregation of HCE, SCE, and CEE.
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Table 2: Regression results for H1
Variables

(1)
Coef.

(2)
Coef.

(3)
Coef.

(4)
Coef.

(5)
Coef.

Constant

0.038

0.044

0.009

0.003

0.010

(0.336)

(0.371)

(0.760)

(0.910)

(0.722)

0.460***

0.464***

0.747***

0.745***

0.744***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

Δlog(Sales)
Δlog(Sales)*D

-0.081

***

(0.002)
Δlog(Sales)*D*SUCC
Δlog(Sales)*D*GDP
Δlog(Sales)*D*PPE
Δlog(Sales)*D*EMP

-0.073

(0.000)

Δlog(Sales)*D*Avoid

-0.270

***

(0.000)

-0.611

***

-0.625***

(0.009)

(0.007)

0.063**

0.282***

0.277***

(0.023)

(0.000)

(0.000)

**

-0.074**

-0.021

-0.067

(0.448)

(0.025)

(0.013)

-0.014**

-0.021*

-0.021*

(0.012)

(0.077)

(0.071)

-0.012

Δlog(Sales)*D*Asset

***

***

-0.016

***

-0.016***

(0.000)

(0.002)

(0.002)

-0.072***

-0.029**

-0.029**

(0.000)

(0.012)

(0.013)

**

**

0.174**

0.122

0.182

(0.017)
NOA
Δlog(Sales)*NOA

(0.014)

(0.012)

-0.006**

-0.007**

-0.007**

(0.023)

(0.025)

(0.028)

0.242

Δlog(Sales)*D*NOA

***

0.249

***

0.242***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.011***

0.012***

0.012***

(0.005)

(0.004)

(0.004)
0.032***

Δlog(Sales)*D*NOA*Avoid

(0.003)
Year effect

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Industry effect

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Number of obs

10 048

10 048

10 048

10 048

10 048

Adj R-squared

0.3729

0.4244

0.5543

0.5604

0.5614

p statistics in parentheses
*
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: This table presents the results of the determinants of cost stickiness using the following regression model:
Log

𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡j,t
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠j,t
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠j,t
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔
+ 𝛽2𝐷j,t ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑔
+
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡j,t-1
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠j,t-1
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠j,t-1

!

𝑅k ∗ 𝐷𝑀j,t,k ∗ 𝐷j,t,k ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑔
!!!

𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠j,t
+ 𝜀𝑗, 𝑡
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠j,t-1

where Cost is operating expenses and Sales is operating revenue. Decrease Dummy (D) is coded as 1 when operating
revenues in year t are less than those in year t-1, and zero otherwise. GDP is gross domestic product growth rate.
SUCC is revenues declines in the preceding period, which is dummy variable and coded as ‘1’ if revenue in t-1 is
lower than revenue in t-2, 0 otherwise. PPE is Property, plant, and equipment intensity, which is measured by the
ratio of property, plant and equipment to sales; Asset intensity (Asset) is measured by the ratio of total assets to sales.
EMP is employee intensity, which is measured by the ratio of the employees’ salaries to sales. Avoid is managerial
incentives to unfavourable earnings, it is a dummy variable that equals 1 if Avoidloss = 1 or Avoiddec = 1, and 0
otherwise. Where Avoidloss is dummy variable coded ‘1’ if firm j has earnings per share higher than or equal to zero
but lower than one cent, and ‘0’ otherwise. Avoiddec is dummy variable coded ‘1’ if firm j has earnings per share
higher than or equal to that for the previous period but the difference is less than one cent, and ‘0’ otherwise. NOA is
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net operating assets, which are measured by shareholders’ equity minus cash, and cash equivalent plus total debt
divided by lagged sales in t-1.

Table 3: Regression results for H2
Vairables
Constant
Δlog(Sales)
Δlog(Sales)*D

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

0.040

0.071

0.066

0.053

0.045

(0.495)

(0.221)

(0.158)

(0.253)

(0.359)

0.413***

0.398***

0.464***

0.471***

0.464***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

-0.024

**

(0.042)
Δlog(Sales)*D*SUCC
Δlog(Sales)*D*GDP
Δlog(Sales)*D*PPE
Δlog(Sales)*D*EMP

-0.034

Δlog(Sales)*D*Avoid

Δlog(Sales)*VAIC

(0.000)

(0.000)

0.139***

0.321***

0.073*

(0.002)

(0.001)

(0.000)

(0.077)

Δlog(Sales)*D*VAIC
HCE

***

-0.034

0.018

-0.119

(0.377)

(0.528)

(0.000)

(0.367)

-0.009**

-0.012**

-0.011***

-0.011**

(0.011)

(0.014)

(0.000)

(0.013)

***

-0.015

***

-0.007

***

-0.026

-0.007***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.000)

-0.104***

-0.077***

-0.013

-0.074***

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.180)

(0.000)

*

0.003***

0.005***

(0.003)

(0.000)

0.068

-0.064***

(0.000)

0.066

***

0.093

***

0.170***

(0.070)
VAIC

-0.093

***

(0.000)

-0.013

Δlog(Sales)*D*Asset

***

0.101

**

(0.045)

0.161

***

(0.000)

0.019*
(0.089)

0.069***

(0.000)

(0.000)

-0.022***

-0.038***

(0.002)

(0.000)
0.116***
(0.000)

Δlog(Sales)*HCE

0.165***
(0.000)

Δlog(Sales)*D*HCE

-0.130***
(0.000)

CEE

0.179***
(0.000)

Δlog(Sales)*CEE

0.079***
(0.000)

Δlog(Sales)*D*CEE

-0.012**
(0.039)

SCE

0.001*
(0.059)
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Table 3 continued
Vairables

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Δlog(Sales)*SCE

(5)
0.005
(0.189)
-0.001*

Δlog(Sales)*D*SCE

(0.089)
Year effect

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Industry effect

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Number of obs

10 048

10 048

10 048

10 048

10 048

Adj R-squared

0.3438

0.3762

0.4988

0.4804

0.425

p statistics in parentheses
*
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: This table presents the results of the determinants of cost stickiness using the following regression model:
Log

𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡j,t
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠j,t
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠j,t
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔
+ 𝛽2𝐷j,t ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑔
+
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡j,t-1
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠j,t-1
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠j,t-1

!

𝑅k ∗ 𝐷𝑀j,t,k ∗ 𝐷j,t,k ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑔
!!!

𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠j,t
+ 𝜀𝑗, 𝑡
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠j,t-1

where Cost is operating expenses and Sales is operating revenue. Decrease Dummy (D) is coded as 1 when operating
revenues in year t are less than those in year t-1, and zero otherwise. GDP is gross domestic product growth rate.
SUCC is revenues declines in the preceding period, which is dummy variable and coded as ‘1’ if revenue in t-1 is
lower than revenue in t-2, 0 otherwise. PPE is Property, plant, and equipment intensity, which is measured by the
ratio of property, plant and equipment to sales; Asset intensity (Asset) is measured by the ratio of total assets to sales.
EMP is employee intensity, which is measured by the ratio of the employees’ salaries to sales. Avoid is managerial
incentives to unfavourable earnings, it is a dummy variable that equals 1 if Avoidloss = 1 or Avoiddec = 1, and 0
otherwise. Where Avoidloss is dummy variable coded ‘1’ if firm j has earnings per share higher than or equal to zero
but lower than one cent, and ‘0’ otherwise. Avoiddec is dummy variable coded ‘1’ if firm j has earnings per share
higher than or equal to that for the previous period but the difference is less than one cent, and ‘0’ otherwise. HCE is
human capital efficiency. SCE represents structural capital efficiency. CEE is capital employed efficiency. VAIC is
the aggregation of HCE, SCE, and CEE.
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Table 4: Regression results for additional test (the effect of IFRS)
Panel A: descriptive statistics of interested variables pre and post IFRS
Post-IFRS (Year
Pre-IFRS (Year 1990
2006 to 2016)
T-test
to 2005) (N=4721)
(N=5327)
Variable
Mean
Std. Dev.
Mean
Std. Dev.
t-value
NOA
1.283
1.766
1.313
1.847
-0.832
VAIC
0.601
3.358
1.339
3.277
-11.120***
HCE
0.805
0.903
1.073
1.495
-11.012***
SCE
-0.724
2.576
-0.825
2.440
2.011**
CEE
0.520
0.784
1.091
0.885
-34.294***
Panel B: regression results
Variables
(1)
(2)
(3)
Constant

Coef.

Coef.

Coef.

0.045

0.010

0.083

(0.363)
Δlog(Sales)

0.465

***

(0.000)
Δlog(Sales)*D

-0.048

***

(0.000)
Δlog(Sales)*D*SUCC
Δlog(Sales)*D*GDP

0.068

*

Δlog(Sales)*D*Avoid
Post
Δlog(Sales)*Post

(0.001)
***

-0.020

***

-0.002

***

-0.069

***

(0.102)
-0.020

*

(0.094)
-0.016

***

(0.002)
-0.036

***

0.303***

(0.002)
-0.001***
(0.001)
0.003***
(0.000)
-0.097***

(0.000)

(0.004)

(0.000)

**

**

0.152**

(0.029)

(0.027)

(0.014)

0.004

0.043

0.010

(0.936)

(0.190)

0.120

0.303

**

-0.013

**

0.124

0.432

***

(0.000)
-0.030

***

(0.000)
0.007

**

0.174***
0.021***
(0.000)

Δlog(Sales)*Post*NOA

(0.000)

-0.127***

(0.003)
Δlog(Sales)*D*NOA

-0.093***

-0.052

(0.023)
Δlog(Sales)*NOA

(0.000)

-0.041

(0.039)
NOA

-0.064

***

0.413***

(0.000)

(0.011)
Δlog(Sales)*D*Post

(0.000)

(0.152)

(0.000)

(0.000)
Δlog(Sales)*D*Asset

***

(0.095)

(0.004)
Δlog(Sales)*D*EMP

0.551

0.297

(0.161)
Δlog(Sales)*D*PPE

(0.568)

0.127*
(0.076)

(0.866)
0.373**
(0.034)
-0.060***
(0.000)

p-value
0.203
0.000
0.000
0.022
0.000
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Table 4 Panel B continued
Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.012*

Δlog(Sales)*D*Post*NOA

(0.084)
0.005***

VAIC

(0.000)
0.157***

Δlog(Sales)*VAIC

(0.000)
-0.067***

Δlog(Sales)*D*VAIC

(0.000)
0.053**

Δlog(Sales)*Post*VAIC

(0.032)
-0.015***

Δlog(Sales)*D*Post*VAIC

(0.000)
Year effects

YES

YES

YES

Industry effects

YES

YES

YES

Number of obs

10 048

10 048

10 048

Adj R-squared

0.4251

0.5698

0.3902

p statistics in parentheses
*
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: This table presents the results of the determinants of cost stickiness using the following regression model:
Log

𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡j,t
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠j,t
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠j,t
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔
+ 𝛽2𝐷j,t ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑔
+
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡j,t-1
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠j,t-1
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠j,t-1

!

𝑅k ∗ 𝐷𝑀j,t,k ∗ 𝐷j,t,k ∗ 𝐿𝑜𝑔
!!!

𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠j,t
+ 𝜀𝑗, 𝑡
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠j,t-1

where Cost is operating expenses and Sales is operating revenue. Decrease Dummy (D) is coded as 1 when operating
revenues in year t are less than those in year t-1, and zero otherwise. GDP is gross domestic product growth rate.
SUCC is revenues declines in the preceding period, which is dummy variable and coded as ‘1’ if revenue in t-1 is
lower than revenue in t-2, 0 otherwise. PPE is Property, plant, and equipment intensity, which is measured by the
ratio of property, plant and equipment to sales; Asset intensity (Asset) is measured by the ratio of total assets to sales.
EMP is employee intensity, which is measured by the ratio of the employees’ salaries to sales. Avoid is managerial
incentives to unfavourable earnings, it is a dummy variable that equals 1 if Avoidloss = 1 or Avoiddec = 1, and 0
otherwise. Where Avoidloss is dummy variable coded ‘1’ if firm j has earnings per share higher than or equal to zero
but lower than one cent, and ‘0’ otherwise. Avoiddec is dummy variable coded ‘1’ if firm j has earnings per share
higher than or equal to that for the previous period but the difference is less than one cent, and ‘0’ otherwise. NOA is
net operating assets, which are measured by shareholders’ equity minus cash, and cash equivalent plus total debt
divided by lagged sales in t-1. HCE is human capital efficiency. SCE represents structural capital efficiency. CEE is
capital employed efficiency. VAIC is the aggregation of HCE, SCE, and CEE. Post is dummy variable that equals 1
if year from 2006-2016, ‘0’ otherwise.

